JURY TRIALS IN JAPAN1
Robert M. Bloom∗
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, I hosted a group of Japanese lawyers and judges from the Osaka
Bar Association Committee for Judicial System Reform,2 a group interested in observing
the jury system in the United States. I took them to the Massachusetts Superior Court3
where they could observe jury trials. From the discussions I had with the visitors, it was
clear that they were keenly interested in the concept of citizen participation in the legal
process.
Japan’s commitment to democracy has flourished for 60 years, and is enshrined in
the preamble of its post-World War II4 Constitution: “Government is a sacred trust of the
people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are
exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by
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the people.”5 Despite this textual commitment, jury trials, a wonderful vehicle for citizen
participation in governmental operation, have not existed in Japan since 1943.6
The French political philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville commented that the jury
functions as “a political institution…one of the forms of the sovereignty of the people.”7
The framers of the United States Constitution envisioned jurors not only as a democratic
check on the government’s efficacy of the court system but also as a way to ensure
citizen participation in governmental activity.8
Inspired largely by the United States Constitution and the American experience
with jury trials9, Japan has sought to introduce jury trials. The objectives of this reform
are to ensure greater participation by average citizens within the Japanese judicial system
and to establish a check on the power of the judiciary. Japan’s desire to adopt jury trials is
the latest in an international trend toward increasing the participation of citizens in the
legal process, particularly in criminal trials.10 Being a juror is envisioned as a way to
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involve average Japanese citizens in the operation of government, a sentiment reflected in
the language of the Justice System Reform Council (JSRC).11 “What commonly underlies
these reforms is the will that each and every person will break out of the consciousness of
being a governed object and will become a governing subject…”12 De Tocqueville
captured the same intent when he commented on the American jury: “Juries invest each
citizen with a sort of magisterial office; they make all . . . feel that they have duties
toward society and that they take a share in its government.”13
Following the recommendations of the JSRC, the Japanese Diet enacted
legislation to create jury trials, and in 2009 the Japanese will institute jury trials for
serious crimes, such as those involving bodily injury.14 The legislation creates a mixedjury system where citizens and professional judges determine criminal responsibility and
sentencing. Specifically, six ordinary citizens (saiban-in) and three professional judges
government in a democratic society, in many countries it has played an important part in the
administration of justice as well. In countries making the transition to democracy, legal reformers
should therefore consider how lay participation could serve to achieve the universal goals of
criminal procedure in a democratic society, that is, the ascertainment of the truth of the charge so
as to ensure the conviction of the guilty and the exoneration of the innocent, the respect of the
human dignity of the accused and the victim in the criminal trial, the protection of society,
restorative justice, the resolution of conflict and rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders. In
doing so, such countries should look to the experiences of other countries as well as to their own
legal history and tradition in assessing the proper role for lay participation in the administration of
criminal justice. Although the economic cost of introducing lay participation is a valid
consideration, legislators should be careful to not use this factor as an excuse for postponing
otherwise necessary and useful reforms.” Stephen C. Thaman, Symposium on Prosecuting
Transnational Crimes: Cross-Cultural Insights for the Former Soviet Union, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L
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will constitute the jury. Decisions are made by a majority of the group (5-4) provided that
at least one citizen and one regular judge agree. In cases where the defendant pleads
guilty, and both parties consent with court approval, a panel consisting of four citizens
and one professional judge will determine the appropriate sentence.
This article will point out that despite the JSRC’s noble motives, a mixed-jury
system in Japan will not result in greater participation by ordinary citizens in the Japanese
legal system unless additional procedural safeguards are enacted.
This article has five parts. In Part One, I begin by highlighting some differences
between mixed-juries and the American jury system and then compare the proposed
Japanese mixed-jury system with European mixed-jury systems . In Part Two, I explain
why the Japanese opted for a mixed-jury system by examining possible historical and
political catalysts for the decision. In Part Three, I explore the psychological theory
surrounding collective judgment and how dominant individuals influence the group
dynamic. In Part Four, I argue that Japanese cultural attitudes will impede the
effectiveness of a mixed-jury system in Japan. Finally, in Part Five, I propose specific
procedural devices to overcome the obstacles inherent in the proposed Japanese mixedjury system that will ensure citizen participation, and accomplish the JSRC’s stated
objectives.
MIXED-JURY SYSTEM
The concept of juries of twelve and unanimous verdicts had its roots in the
Middle Ages.15 Medieval juries were fact finders in the true sense of the term, as they
were selected based upon their familiarity with the parties and the facts of the dispute and
were responsible for finding facts outside the realm of court proceedings.
15
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The American-jury system grew out of a desire for more efficient, less-costly, and
less arbitrary administration of justice and is deeply rooted in the history and tradition of
the United States. 16 In many colonies, the right to a trial-by-jury preceded the practice’s
incorporation into the Constitution.17 Unlike the medieval juror, they wouldn’t do
independent fact finding but relied on what was presented in court. The jurors were
chosen for their impartiality and told to rely on the presentation of facts as presented by
the lawyers.18 Unanimous verdicts and juries of 12 were largely adopted by the states.19
In the 1970s, in criminal cases, the requirement for unanimous verdicts and juries of
twelve were modified by the Supreme Court.20 Notably, in addition to various pragmatic
considerations, participation on a jury was considered an important exercise of political
power.21 Thus, the jury system was considered an important means to attaining civil
liberties and a fundamental pillar of democracy.22
A mixed-jury consists of professional judges and ordinary citizens (lay judges)
who work together to determine culpability and sentencing.
Mixed-juries differ from juries in the United States in a number of ways. In a
mixed-jury system, a legal professional (the judge) provides learned guidance during jury
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deliberation,23 a potentially beneficial structure given the common lack of comprehension
by jurors of the judge’s instructions on the law in the United States.24 Another positive
aspect of a mixed-jury system is the more active role of jurors, who may have an
opportunity to ask questions during the trial process.25 Additionally, in mixed-jury
systems, jurors often serve for multiple years and hear numerous cases. In this way, with
a greater experiential base, they might be able to act with more confidence with a
professional judge and thereby more readily express their opinions.26 Unlike the United
States where generally unanimous verdicts are required for conviction of a crime, a
majority vote usually determines culpability in a mixed-jury system. In addition, because
of mixed-juries decide issues of fact and law, they avoid the difficult dilemma facing
juries in the US who are forced to separate questions of law and fact.27 Mixed-juries also
participate in the sentencing as well as the adjudication of a case.
In the United States, the jury verdict is not subject to appeal by the state in
criminal prosecution because of double jeopardy protection28 and appeals by the
defendant are limited in most instances to law with the finding of facts by the jury given
23
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involvement of jurors. See, e.g., 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 35 (reforms in Tennessee allowing for juror notetaking and questioning of witnesses) see Nicole L. Mott, The Jury in Practice: The Current Debate on Juror
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great deference. In most mixed-jury systems, there can be a de-novo review of both law
and fact.
While all mixed-jury systems have certain basic traits in common, the countries
that utilize a mixed-jury system have taken widely varying approaches on jury size,
voting requirements, whether and how appeals are handled, how jurors are selected, and
what type of cases the jury can hear.
The legislation passed by the Japanese Diet has laid out some of the procedural
requirements of a mixed-jury system. In cases in which guilt is contested, the jury will be
a panel of nine: six lay jurors and three judges.29 In cases where there is an
acknowledgment of guilt and consent by the parties, the panel shall consist of one judge
and four lay jurors.30 Jurors shall be 20 years or older and able to vote.31 Convictions
shall be by a majority vote provided that one lay judge and one professional judge agree.
The jurisdiction of the mixed-jury is restricted to those cases which are punishable by
death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for at least a year where the crime committed
by an intentional act caused the death of a victim.32 There is also a provision for an
immediate appeal.33 The three-judge Court of Appeals (Kososhin) considers both the law
and the facts of the jury trial. Appeals can be taken by either the defense or prosecution.
While Japan’s approach to mixed juries borrows heavily from similar systems in
Europe, Japan’s proposed mixed jury system is unique. By briefly examining how mixed
juries operate in Italy, Germany, Denmark and France, one gets a better idea of how the
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Japanese system will differ from European mixed-juries, and what aspects of the mixed
jury system the JSRC found especially important.
Italy
The Corte d’assise, Italy’s version of the mixed-jury, is composed of one
professional judge who serves as “president of the court,” one professional judge from
the Tribunale (an all professional judge court), and six lay judges.34 To qualify for service
as a lay juror one must possess Italian citizenship, exhibit good moral conduct, be
between the ages of thirty and sixty-five, and have completed secondary school
education.35 The lay jurors preside over the trial with the professional judges and enjoy
equal judicial authority.36 The jurisdiction of the Corte d’assises, is limited to cases
involving serious crimes, such as those that result in death or are punishable by a prison
sentence from twenty-four years to life, and crimes against the state (treason). 37 A simple
majority is required for deciding guilt or innocence, and sentencing. Tie votes are
interpreted as an acquittal, yet the most lenient punishment will prevail if no simple
majority is attained.38 Appeals from the Corte d’assise in Italy are heard by the Corte
d’assise d’appello, which is also made up of two professional judges and six lay jurors.39
Because in Italy, broad appellate rights are afforded both parties, issues of law and fact
can be appealed by the defendant or the prosecution and either side may introduce new
evidence to the appellate tribunal.40 The Corte di Cassazione is the highest of the
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appellate courts in Italy.41 This court is responsible for reconciling matters of law and is
not concerned with matters of fact. Each section of the Corte di Cassazione is comprised
of five professional judges.

France
The Cour d’assises, the only court in the French criminal system that uses a
mixed-jury, has jurisdiction over serious crimes, punishable by a prison term in excess of
ten years.42 The jury is made up of three professional judges and nine lay jurors.43All
decisions regarding culpability or punishment, unfavorable to the defendant must be
made by an eight-to-four majority.44 In France, jurors must possess French citizenship
with full privileges, be between the ages of twenty-three and sixty-one, and be able to
read and write.45 Due to the perceived influence of the local government, lay jurors
cannot be civil servants, government ministers, parliamentarians, police or military
officials.46
Jurors are selected at random from the electoral role.47 After being screened by a
joint committee, a final selection list is drawn up.48 Thirty days before the Cour d’assises
first sits, a panel of thirty-five jurors is selected, from which nine are selected for any

41

Campanella, supra at note 34 at 79.
Renee Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial For an American Murder
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particular case by the president in open court.49 There are a total of nine preemptory
challenges, five challenges for the defense, and four for the prosecution.50 No appeal,
except concerning issues of law, is possible from the Cour d’assise.51 This is likely
because the defendant was afforded a jury of his peers and all decisions of the Cour
d’assise are automatically reviewed by a subdivision of the appellate court without
request from either the prosecution or defense.52 Issues of law may be appealed to the
Supreme Court of Appeal (Cour de Cassation).53 The appellate jurisdiction of this court is
limited to: (i) a decision by an irregularly constituted tribunal, (ii) jurisdiction questions,
(iii) decision in breach of procedural requirements, (iv) a decision not supported by
written grounds, and (v) a decision not supported by law.54
Germany
In Germany, there are two mixed jury systems and the first-instance courts are
broken into three categories: Local Court, District Court, and Supreme Court.55 The
mixed-jury section of the Local Court has jurisdiction over misdemeanors punishable by
up to three years in prison, and consists of a panel containing one professional judge and
two lay jurors. The District Court has a second type of mixed jury which is comprised of
three professional judges and two lay judges and has jurisdiction over serious
misdemeanors, capital offenses, and crimes punishable by over three years in prison.56
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The Supreme Court, consisting of five professional judges, has sole jurisdiction over
crimes against the state, including murder.57
For the mixed-juries in both the Local Court and the District Court, a two-thirds
majority is required for any decision on guilt or innocence or punishment. The appellate
system in Germany is slightly more complicated than its continental counterparts. If one
of the two parties is not satisfied with the judgment, it has two remedies: appeal or
revision.58 An appeal may be made against a decision of the local court and will address
issues of fact and law.59 These appeals proceed as a new trial with the appellate court rehearing evidence.60 However, this appeal is discretionary and can be denied if the
appellate court believes the decision of the trial court was correct.61 The District Court
presides over these “re-trial” appeals62 and such appeals are not afforded against
decisions of the Supreme Court or of the District Court when it serves as a court of first
instance.63
Unlike the appeal procedure, the revision procedure considers only matters of law
and seeks to provide legal consistency throughout the German Republic.64 All first
instance decisions are subject to appeal by revision,65 presided over by the Supreme
Courts and Federal Supreme Court.66 Appeals by revision do not re-consider facts and
will only occur where if the original judgment was procedurally incorrect or not
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Id.
Id. at 132-133.
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60
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62
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63
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64
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65
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58
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supported by substantive law.67 In this sense the appeals by revision process is very
similar to the appeals process in the United States. The German system acts to insure
legal consistency throughout the country by subjecting these decisions to revision by the
highest courts in Germany.
Denmark
Denmark adopted its mixed-jury system in 1937 as a means of expanding public
participation in criminal trials.68 Lay participants are used only in cases where the
defendant pleads not guilty.

69

Where the potential punishment is more than four years,

involves a political crime, or involves a question about the defendant being placed in an
institution, juries of twelve lay participants determine guilt.70 Only economic crimes are
excluded from the jurisdiction of jury trials as they are thought to be too complicated.71 A
2/3 vote of 8 to 4 is required for conviction.72After reaching a guilty verdict, the jury then
deliberates with three professional judges to determine sentencing.73 Each of the
professional judges has four votes equaling the votes of the twelve jurors.74 In the event
of a tie, the defendant receives the lesser penalty.75 Appeals in these cases are handled by
the Supreme Court which can alter the length of the penalty, decide whether the High
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69
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(2003)
70
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75
Id.
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Court made errors of law, or determine whether there were procedural errors.76 The Court
does not review the jury’s decision of guilt.77
Criminal charges that might result in more than a fine but less than four years of
prison are initially heard in Municipal Court.78 In these cases, the mixed jury consists of
two lay judges and one professional judge, who determine guilt and sentencing.79 In
these cases any question, including guilt, can be appealed.80 Appeals are handled by
another mixed-jury consisting of three lay participants and three professional judges in
the High Court.81 While typically a case can only be appealed once, in very special
circumstances, the decision of the mixed-jury on the High Court can be appealed to the
Supreme Court. 82

HISTORY OF REFORM
Academics have highlighted several reasons for Japan’s renewed interest in jury
trials. In his article, Kiss83 discusses several of these factors, including the aura of
cynicism that surrounds the judiciary. Anderson and Nolan point out that in addition to
the desire to deliver better justice and better democracy, some Japanese view a lay
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assessor system as necessary to ensure international competitiveness in the 21st century
and as a means of making trials shorter and more efficient.84
One reason for the current reforms were a series of highly controversial criminal
cases in the 1980s. Between 1983 and 1989, there were four controversial death penalty
cases involving overturned confessions. The four wrongfully convicted defendants in
these cases spent a combined 130 years in prison before ultimately being released.85 The
publicity associated with these cases reflected especially adversely on the judiciary.
Specifically, the cases highlighted that the Japanese criminal justice system had a 99.9%
conviction rate, with judges almost always supporting the prosecution. 86 In 1987, as a
result of the judiciary’s role in these four wrongful convictions and mounting domestic
pressure for reform, Chief Justice Koichi Yaguchi of the Japanese Supreme Court
initiated a study examining the feasibility of the jury system in Japan.87
Judges in Japan are chosen from a competitive exam after college graduation.88
The low passage rate on this exam suggests that judges represent a highly intelligent,
well-educated part of society.89 They are an elitist, homogenous group with limited life
84

Supra note 6
Daniel Foote, From Japan’s Death Row to Freedom, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 11 (1992) (documenting
cases).
86
Yumi Wijers-Hasegawa, Jury System Needs to be Made Accessible for Citizens, THE JAPAN TIMES,
August 5, 2003 (explaining the high conviction rate might be that prosecution only brings airtight casesjudge sonobe is the source). See David T. Johnson, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE, 215-218 (2002)
(finding this prosecutorial practice as well) See also, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)
(noting, “Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other
respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the
determination of guilt or innocence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in
serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the
States.” It would also suggest another reason for the high conviction rate is that prosecutors tend to
bring only strong cases.
87
See Foote, supra at note 71 at 83-84.
88
One becomes a judge after taking the National Legal Examination (Shilo Shikh) then followed by two
years of apprentice training. See Kiss supra note 14.
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their society as gaku-reki shakai, one which an individual’s future is determined by their academic record.
85
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experience.90 Given their youth at the commencement of their judgeship, they tend to be
more impressionable and are therefore subject to greater influence by some of the veteran
actors in the system.91 In addition, judges wish to avoid an appellate court overturning
their decisions, which could hinder their career.92 Moreover, the success of a judge’s
career in Japan seems linked to his/her readiness to defer to the ruling party and thus find
in favor of the prosecution.93 Thus there is an incentive to find guilt in order to avoid an
appeal by a prosecutor.94
In addition, because of their societal status, judges are often isolated from
ordinary people. The jury will expose the judge to ordinary citizens who bring their own
life experiences to their work as jurors. It is hoped that the introduction of lay jurors into
the decision-making process will make judges more accessible to the public they serve.
The American jury was similarly intended to keep “class instincts of the judge in
check.”95

There are juku (exam cramming schools) because passing examinations is so important. Twelve years of
pre-college education culminates into two examinations. One taken by all Japanese High School seniors on
the same day and the other for specific university admission.
90
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91
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93
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While the wrongful conviction cases and the high rate of convictions might have
contributed to the exploration of juries in Japan, the major reason for the introduction of
juries seems to be the idea of greater citizen participation in the running of the
government. Indeed, as Richard Lempert notes, “The fact that jurors do bring non-legal
values and understanding to their deliberations is regarded by many as a virtue of the jury
system and a way of introducing an important democratic voice into the least democratic
of the three bricks of the modern liberal state government.” 96
In July 1999, the Japanese Cabinet formed the Justice Reform Council (JRC), a
working group of thirteen prominent lawyers, academics and business executives97, and
asked them to design a Japanese judicial system for the 21st century. One of the project’s
major objectives was to enhance the legitimacy of the judiciary.
This Council sincerely hopes that these Recommendations provide the
opportunity for a new start for the Japanese justice system, that the
reforms proposed herein will steadily be put into effect, and that the
justice system at the earliest possible time becomes one that is easy to use
and meets the expectation and trust of the people.98
More citizen exposure to the courts is one way to achieve this objective.99
Throughout its report, the JSRC uses language that clearly indicates that Japan’s
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objective in establishing a jury system is to empower the citizenry.100 In language
reminiscent of de Tocqueville, the report states:
What commonly underlies these reforms is the will that each and every
person will break out of the consciousness of being governed object and
will become a governing subject, with autonomy and bearing social
responsibility, and that the people will participate in building a free and
fair society in mutual cooperation and will work to restore rich creativity
and vitality to this country.101
With that objective in mind, the JSRC sought to create a mixed-jury (saiban-in) system.
The reformers suggested a mixed-jury system in which judges and citizens deliberate
together:
In order to establish a stronger popular base for the justice system,
measures shall be taken to expand participation of the people in the justice
system. As a new system for popular participation in litigation
proceedings which constitute the core of the justice system, a new system
shall be introduced for a portion of criminal cases. Under this new system,
the general public can work in cooperation with judges, sharing
responsibility for and becoming involved in deciding case autonomously
and meaningfully.102
The hope is that citizen participation will result in greater acceptance of the
justice system and that having citizens work with judges will grant the judiciary wider
public legitimacy. In addition, if lay judges participate as equals, the results of trials,
(over ninety-six percent of which currently end in conviction), could become more
balanced.103 Moreover, greater citizen participation will bring increased legitimacy and
respect to the judiciary by creating the perception that disputes are resolved openly and
fairly.104 In addition, De Tocqueville regarded jury duty as a great educational
100
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opportunity, “a free school” to learn about democracy and the court system in
particular.105
The JSRC’s language regarding the objectives of jury trials and citizen
participation is wonderfully inspirational. However, by adopting a mixed-jury system, the
JSRC has greatly limited its ability to achieve these objectives. Inherent in the choice for
a mixed-jury system is a distrust of the average Japanese citizen to effectively decide
legal issues. While Japan wants to make its judicial system more understandable to its
citizens, it is not prepared to entrust decisions solely to them, an approach seemingly
inconsistent with the democratic ideals that prompted the call for reform in the first place.
As the later section on Japanese culture will demonstrate, the actual participation of
citizens in this type of mixed-system will be minimal as opposed to mixed.

HOW COLLECTIVE JUDGMENTS OCCUR
Juries are group decision-makers, so not surprisingly the process by which they
deliberate is similar to other group decision processes.106 A concept that pervades the
scholarship on group decision-making is that of the “opinion leader”.107 The opinion
leader exists in the jury as the “dominant juror.”108 The dominant juror often has a
considerable effect on the deliberation process.109 To mitigate or neutralize the influence
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of the dominant juror on the jury’s decision-making process, studies are starting to
examine jury characteristics and procedural devices, for selecting, instructing, and
controlling juries.
As part of a group decision-making process, a person often emerges who takes the
lead. This person dictates the agenda by which the decision is made, and ultimately has
an inordinate impact on the final decision. This person, the so-called opinion leader,110
has certain characteristics, such as perceived competence and specific expertise. Certainly
when it comes to legal proceedings, judges have more experience and familiarity and are
thus likely to persuade and lead decisions by a jury.111
The opinion leader analysis was applied specifically to the jury by Hastie, Penrod,
and Pennington in their book entitled “Inside the Jury.” In their research, primarily
conducted through post-trial juror questionnaires, they found an individual juror’s
perceived persuasiveness was inextricably linked to the juror’s level of education (and
associated indicia such as income, social status, and occupation).112 Much like the
“opinion leader” these qualities are undoubtedly embodied by a judge in a manner that
would allow him or her to emerge as the dominant juror during a trial.
The impact that the “opinion leader” has over decision-making is extensive. 113 A
study conducted by Solomon Asch asked a group of individuals to observe a line that was
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drawn on a white card.114 They were then asked to select one card from three; specifically
the one which they thought best represented the line drawn on the original card.115 There
were eight participants in the study. In the first two selections all eight chose correctly. In
the third round, some participants were told to select incorrectly in order to observe the
impact this would have on the unknowing participant. Despite knowing the obvious error
in the selection, Seventy percent of the subjects went against their senses and followed
the incorrect majority at least once.116 This effect was enhanced if the subject perceived
himself to be a member of the group, something that a juror likely would feel about her
relationship with her peer jurors.117 Asch concluded, “That we have found the tendency
to conformity in our society so strong that reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young
people are willing to call white, black, this is a matter of concern.”118 The results of this
study become even more disturbing as we explore the importance of group identity in
Japanese culture. It is interesting to note in a Japanese study which measured the effect of
different ratios of citizens to judges (2 judges-9 to 11 citizens or 3 judges-six citizens),
the increasing of judges did not necessarily avoid the judicial dominance.119
In her study about group minority opinions, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann identified
a concept known as the “Spiral of Silence.”120 In her attempt to rationalize a sudden shift
in German voting behavior days before an election, Noelle-Neumann observed that the
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position with the most vocal support appeared stronger than it really was and other
positions appeared weaker. Once a position dominated the discourse proponents of the
other positions were drowned out. She called this process a “spiral of silence.”121
According to the “spiral of silence” theory, a viewpoint that receives more vocal support
can dominate and eventually extinguish competing opinions. Applying the “spiral of
silence” to jury deliberations, the dominant juror is likely to be the most vocal or at least
the most influential participant in the deliberations and may therefore actually silence
other jurors.122
In 1970, the Supreme Court of the United States approved the constitutionality of
a six-person criminal jury,123 and later approved the constitutionality of a six-person civil
jury;124 prior to these decisions a twelve-person jury was constitutionally required.125
Immediately following the Court’s rulings, scholars began to study the effect that jury
size has on the dominance of a single juror. Research suggests that because people’s
timidity and insecurity are greater in larger numbers thus rendering them less likely to
speak,126 a larger jury enhances the likelihood of domination by an individual juror.
A second area of research is the extent to which jurors are allowed to participate
in the court proceedings. In an effort to enhance the understanding of jurors, especially
in light of complex litigation, some courts have endorsed witness-questioning by
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jurors.127 In DeBenedetto,128 the Fourth Circuit allowed juror-questioning in extreme
circumstances yet warned of the power this gives to the dominant juror: “…one or two
jurors often will be stronger than the other jurors, and will dominate the jury inquiries.”129
The court feared that the dominant juror who audibly relayed their questions would be
able to influence fellow jurors and thus persuade and impose premature deliberation.130
The court’s fears were realized in DeBenedetto, when the dominant foreperson asked
over half of the ninety-five questions asked during trial.131
One way to allay such fears of juror dominance associated with audible witness
questioning is to permit only written questions, reviewed and asked by the judge. Such an
approach was endorsed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 1999.132
A third area of focus that researches have looked at is juror note-taking with some
concern that note-taking skills correlate to an individual’s level of education thus creating
a further opportunity for juror dominance.133 However, a recent study showed that the
connection between note-taking and deliberation dominating was not steadfast.134
Despite the seemingly unavoidable reality of the existence of the dominant juror,
accurate decisions are still likely to be reached. One study showed that regardless of the
make-up of the jury, a twelve-person panel was able to reach the correct decision eightythree percent of the time, compared to a sixty-nine percent accuracy for six-person
127
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panels. Similarly, a recent study showed that, groups, regardless of their make-up, were
more accurate decision makers than individuals at least concerning complex matters.135
Moreover, studies overwhelmingly show that larger groups are more likely to render
accurate decisions.136
JAPANESE CULTURE
The importance of social status within Japanese culture was driven home for me
during a six-week teaching experience in Japan.137 The janitor of my office building
would greet me each day with a low bow. One day, as a symbol of my respect for him, I
tried to bow lower than him during our morning encounter. I saw that this made the
janitor rather uncomfortable (which certainly was not my objective!). I saw similar
examples of this consciousness of social status during dinners following my talks before
various Japanese bar associations when I, as the honored guest, was seated next to the
person of highest status (the President of the bar association).
Japan’s unique cultural attributes present a large challenge to establishing
meaningful citizen participation in the Japanese judicial system. Even in its report, the
JSRC recognizes inherent impediments in Japanese society that inhibit meaningful citizen
participation. The people are accustomed to being governed, and view the “government
as the ruler (the authority).”138 The Council’s recommendations seek to transform the
people from passive to active participants in the operation of the government.139
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Japanese culture puts a high value on group relationships. The slang expression
“going along to get along” is particularly applicable to Japanese culture. A distinction
exists in Japanese society between what one says (tatemae) and what one really thinks
(honne). Not expressing oneself honestly has a great deal to do with fitting in to the
group. The emphasis on fitting-in is highlighted in elementary-school text books in Japan
that state that good relationships with others are valued more than asserting one’s own
ideas.140 The concept of harmony is a cornerstone of Japanese culture, a concept found in
the first clause of an early Japanese constitution dating back to 697 A.D. “Harmony is to
be valued, and an avoidance of wanton opposition to be honored.” There is a Japanese
proverb that captures the importance of harmony: “The nail that sticks up gets pounded
down.”141
What flows from this desire to get along is a great emphasis on group
identification. Much of a Japanese individual’s self-esteem comes with his/her group
identification. Thus, group disapproval can be devastating. Some even suggest that group
disapproval provides a powerful deterrent for crime in Japan.142
In addition to fitting in there is also great respect, and resulting deference to one’s
social status as reflected in wealth, profession, and position. The Japanese have a high
level of respect for authority figures, a definite legacy of the Confucianism influence.
There are three relationships prominent in Confucian ethic – father-son, ruler-subjects,
and husband-wife. Each of these relationships emphasizes deference to the superior
passively depends on regulation from above, and to rebuild and form a self-reliant base. The departure
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figure.143 In a family, usually the opinion of the household head is the rule. Any
dissenting opinions are regarded as disloyal.144
Similar status issues also appear in the language. In English, the word “you” is
used to describe anyone regardless of status. In Japanese, age, gender, and status affect
the form of address. Given the emphasis that in effective group decision-making,
everyone must be of equal status, it is somewhat problematic when the language itself
calls attention to various status concerns.145
The Japanese people prefer trial by “those above the
people” rather than by “their fellows,” and that this caused
the Japanese to distrust juries from the beginning. People
trust judges because they have a special sense of
responsibility when adjudicating cases and try to keep their
moral standards high in order to ensure impartial trials.
Therefore, citizen participation in the judicial process is
ultimately not suitable for the Japanese people because
citizens would simply prefer to have a judge decide their
case rather than their fellow citizens. Scholars disagree on
exactly how much weight should be given to the cultural
aspect of the failure of the earlier jury system in Japan, but
most agree culture played some part.146

Anderson and Nolan would question the assumption that Japanese citizens would
automatically defer to the judge’s opinion. They point out that the JSRC, aware of this
cultural perception thought that with the appropriate leadership and education this
cultural deference would change over time.147 Hierarchy, harmony, and group identity,
are three powerful reasons why a mixed-jury system will tend to stifle free and open jury
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deliberation, and leads to several questions. First, will the superior figure of the judge
become the dominant juror and have an undue influence on the jury panel? In any
society, judges are respected and have a great deal of influence. In the United States,
“jurors typically begin their jury experience by viewing the judge with great deference.
Jurors are laypersons, and look up to the judge, who is an authority figure, robed in
black, seated on high with gavel in hand; clearly the judge is experienced and in control
of the proceedings”.
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When we couple this with the hierarchal nature of Japanese

culture, we are presented with a difficult problem especially when we consider the groupdecision making data. Secondly, with the ideal of harmony engrained in the Japanese
psyche will dissenting opinions be put forward? Finally, given the emphasis placed on
group approval, how many jurors will take a position and risk the wrath of the group?149
As has been previously mentioned, a majority vote is all that the legislation
required for conviction.150 Although some studies have indicated that a majority vote or
unanimous verdicts can be similar151, the concern of the dominance of judges within the
deliberation process might be alleviated if a unanimous vote were instituted. At a
minimum, it would improve the perception of meaningful citizen deliberation. At a
maximum, it might enhance the quality of argument during the deliberation process as
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one holdout would have to be convinced to change positions.152 Certainly a unanimous
vote or a minimum 2/3 vote would foster greater deliberation because it would be
necessary to convince jurors not agreeing with the majority position.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Notwithstanding the basic structure of the mixed-jury system, there are a number
of implementary and procedural measures that can ensure “meaningful and autonomous
participation.” Although, as previously expressed, there are some inherent problems with
mixed-juries, the following recommendations are made in light of the confines of the
system adopted by the Japanese Diet.
PRINCIPAL OF ORALITY
The trend in Japan has been toward greater orality, and non-oral evidence is only
admissible with the consent of the parties. The term orality refers to evidence presented
to the factfinder through the testimony of live witnesses. Even with a guilty plea consent
is required for the introduction of a written statements. Orality during contested trials
should go a long way to putting the prosecution and defense on equal footing so that
prosecutors unable to rely on written documents will need to work harder by presenting
witnesses at trial in order to prove their cases.
Another reason for the high conviction rate is the use of confessions. Confessions
are allowed in a vast majority of cases and often form the basis for the conviction. Since
suspects may be detained for up to 23 days before charging, it is not surprising that
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confessions are obtained.153 Because of their importance in the system, there is a great
deal of pressure on prosecutors to secure confessions. This pressure, coupled with the 23day detention could lead to abusive tactics in obtaining confessions.154 Greater orality in
the system, will help expose the possible abuses in obtaining confessions.
Orality also allows the system to take advantage of the collective wisdom and
common sense of the jury; the jury must evaluate live witnesses to access their verbal and
non-verbal attributes. “To ensure that saibin-in who are laypersons, can sufficiently form
decisions by examining the evidence presented at trial, it is necessary to materialize the
principles of orality and directness.”155 Another concern for jury comprehension is that
trials presently within the jury trial jurisdiction once commenced are often interrupted
and continued for various periods (weekly or a month).

To maximize the benefits of

orality and ensure that jurors memories remain intake, once a trial begins it should be
completed without interruption.
The only exception to the principle of orality should occur when the witness is
unavailable (out of the jurisdiction or ill) and there exists some indicia of truthfulness of
the out-of-court (on a par with the rules of hearsay developed in American
jurisprudence). A deposition with all parties represented might provide sufficient
truthfulness to allow for such an exception. A section of the legislation would seem to
minimize the importance of orality as it allows for examinations of witnesses outside of
the courthouse. It does, however, allow for the presence of jurors who may then
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participate in the examination.156 This provision is limited to witnesses who because of
health, age, occupation or other limitations, cannot testify in court.157
ACTIVE ROLE FOR JURORS
A movement in the United States has begun to reform the jury system so as to
encourage jurors to take a more active role during the trial.158 The assumption that jurors
who passively sit throughout a trial will retain and understand the evidence is hardly
consistant with educational pedagogy. It is thought that greater juror comprehension will
occur if steps are taken to involve jurors before the Judge’s instructions at the end of the
trial, so methods have been developed to involve jurors more in the trial process.159
This greater involvement of jurors will result in a more knowledgable jury. More
knowledge in a mixed system is crucial to leveling the playing field between the judges
and jurors. To this end the Japanese legislation allows for jurors to participate in the
questioning of all the witnesses including the defendant.160Although there were no
provisions for note-taking in the legislation, one would assume that it is allowable. It
appears that deliberation is to occur at the end of the trial.161 I would suggest that they
implement a pre-deliberation mechanism. Most jurisdictions in the United States frown
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on such deliberations, as they are concerned that jurors will make up their minds before
they have heard all the evidence. However, with a judge present, such pre-deliberation
discussions could avoid such a predetermination as the judge will carefully monitor the
discussions. These preliminary discussions help jurors retain and process the pieces of
information they are hearing. This predeliberation would be especially useful during a
long trial. In addition I would recommend pre-trial instructions as to the law and
explanations as to the various trial procedures and type of rulings be given to the jurors.
At the start of the trial these instructions should include the various elements of the crime
before the jury as well as the procedural steps to be followed during the trial. This
approach will not only address the power imbalance but will aid the saiban in
understanding the importance and relevance of the evidence and will help them
remember the evidence during the final deliberation process.162

DELIBERATIONS
Since jury deliberations in the United States are conducted in great secrecy, little
is known about how jurors actually deliberate. Each jury is free to structure the
deliberations as it sees fit with the only requirement being the selection of a foreperson.
Jurors in the United States report that they would often go into deliberations without
being given guidance as to how to deliberate.163 Because of my previously expressed
concerns about the Japanese mixed-jury system, I would suggest a carefully structured
deliberation process.
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Foreperson
The conduct of the judge(s) on the mixed jury during the deliberation is crucial.
Judges should be trained so as to allow for meaningful and autonomous participation of
lay jurors. Although the legislation does not reflect this safeguards, there is at least
recognition of concerns centering on the active participation of lay jurors during the
deliberation process. One requirement notes that jurors must be given an opportunity to
state their opinion and that the judges are required to see that the opportunity arises.
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To this end, I suggest that a layperson be chosen as a foreperson (leader of the jury). I
would have the presiding judge select this person based upon the judge’s assessment of
the person’s leadership and character.

This foreperson should be given a simple

instruction manual and/or video to describe his/her responsibilities. By having a
layperson as chair of the jury deliberation, I would hope to diminish the role of the judge.
An additional safeguard would require the foreperson to meet with each juror privately
and solicit his/her position. In this way, each juror would not be influenced by the
conformity principles found in the society. Judges should also withhold their opinions
until each juror has expressed his/her opinion. It is worthy to note that many japanese
judges, sitting in panels of three, are accustomed to having the younger judges express
their opinion first so as to eliminate the hesitation that less experienced judges may have
in expressing their opinion.
Before expressing their opinion, judges should act more as evidentiary
advisors to the lay jurors. During deliberation, judges should help ensure that the
evidence is given its appropriate weight. For example, evidence which is highly
prejudicial because of its emotional appeal, the judge should suggest that it not be given
164
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undue weight. Because evidentiary rules can be complex and difficult for lay persons to
understand, an advantage that a mixed-jury system has is that the elaborate evidence rules
found in the United States are not necessary. The evidentiary rules exist largely because
of an inherent distrust that the jurors will misuse information.
To insure meaningful citizen participation and to guard against the judge’s control
of the deliberation, the jury decision should be a detailed record of the process. The JSRC
recognized the need to have a transcript of jury deliberation to ensure the trust of the
public, litigants, and to retain an appeal-able record.165 Stephen C. Thurman recommends
the French system in which the presiding judge summarizes the argument of the defense
and prosecution and then has a series of questions regarding the facts. The jury’s
response to these questions will then be utilized in applying the law, and the answer will
also be included in the record.166 This approach is similar to the special-verdict approach
utilized in the United States Law, in which jurors decide fact issues on a case-by-case
basis without considering issues of law.167 Their responses to these questions are
recorded and the trial proceeds under the aegis of their answer. Moreover, as Professor
Mark Brodin points out, the special verdict is an adequate procedural remedy to the
problem of jurors’ confusion with legal concepts inherent when they are called upon to
determine mixed law and fact questions.168 In additon, a jury instruction explicitly stating
that the jurors are indeed independent and are free to disagree with the judge is
imperative.
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Educate the Public
Since service by the initial group of jurors will be a totally new experience, it is
imperative that the notice to jurors empathetically consider and address many of the
jurors’ concerns. Brochures or videos should be sent describing the importance of this
civic service as well as how it will operate. Carefull marketing should be employed so as
to alleviate anxiety as well as provide positive encouragement and incentive to show up.
Such mundane issues as how to get to the court, the time of lunch break, the appropriate
dress, should all be addressed.169
To ensure that citizens become more aware of their role as jurors, a massive
public education program should be initiated. This program should include a broad
assortment of tools including: tours of the courthouse, educational television about the
role of the jurors presented by judges and attorneys, an introductory video or lecture by
the judge to jurors on their day of service and publication of easy to read pamphlets and
other reading material. In addition, the idea of jury service should be introduced to school
children at an early age. To this end teachers should be trained and curriculum adjusted.
Hopefully, such a program will help to alleviate the cultural concerns mentioned
earlier.170
SELECTION PROCESS
Jury Pool
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With regard to the selection process of jurors, Japan should not make the same
mistake historically made in the United States of readily granting many exemptions to
perspective jurors. Often people with higher-ranking societal positions ask for, and
receive, exemptions from jury service. A movement to eliminate exemptions took place
in the early 1980’s as jury service became less burdensome. Each juror was guaranteed
that his/her service would be limited to one day or, if chosen, to one trial. The one
day/one trial system is now prevalent throughout the United States. Once a juror fulfills
this requirement, he/she will be exempt from further service for at least three years. In
proposing this approach, I recognize that many countries utilize mixed-jury jurors who
serve for a period of several years.171 Although I see the benefit of this experience to
ensure a more confident and forceful juror, I am concerned that the extent of the
commitment might eliminate certain well-educated members of the Japanese society with
important positions (e.g. doctors, teachers). I would advocate for less-experienced,
more-intelligent jurors than more-experienced, less-intelligent jurors.
With exemptions utilized, it is not uncommon to have a jury panel made up of
elderly or underemployed people. The reduction and elimination of exemptions has
resulted in a more meaningful cross-section of jurors. In this way, more people with
responsible, societal positions will be part of the jury. From the data on collective
decision making previously discussed, it appears that better-educated individuals would
have more confidence to express their position in deliberation with a judge, who is
perceived as an individual with an elevated societal status.
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People who are 20 years or older and eligible to vote and have completed 9 years
of compulsory education or can demonstrate equivalent learning are eligible for jury
service.172 Similar to the American trend of one trial or one day, the legislation allows a
juror to refuse service if they have previously served within five years.173 There are
numerous exemptions including governement officials and anyone associated with the
court and a catch-all discretionary exemption “…their business will suffer damage if they
do not handle the important matter relating to the business.”174 I have concerns that this
type of general exemptions might result in jurors with lesser social status to selected
participate equally with the judges.
The system adopted by the Diet also has a provision for preemptory challenges to
jurors.175 This provision is rather troubling in light of the prosecutor’s considerable
success in the high rate of conviction. He/she might be inclined to exercise his/her
preemptory challenges on jurors who are well educated and more likely to express
themselves in the deliberation.176
Impartiality
The goal of any jury system is to have impartial jurors. But what is meant by
“impartial” is a crucial consideration. By “impartial” I do not mean absolute ignorance of
the case. Mark Twain, a famous American author, commented in 1871 as follows: “a
noted desperado (criminal) killed Mr. B, a good citizen, in the most wanton and coldblooded way . . . the papers were full of it, and all men capable of reading read about it.”
172

Criminal Trial, supra note 29, at art.art 13 and art. 14(1)(i). Requirement for completing compulsory
education (9 years) unless there is a demonstration they have the requisite intelligence.
173
Id. at art. 16 1)d)
174
Id. at art. 16 1)g)
175
Id. at art. 36. Three premtory chllenges are allocated to the public prosecutor and the defense attorney.
176
See Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 5 NW. U. L.
REV. 190, 194 (1990). See also Bateson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986); Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42 (1992); JEB v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994)

35

The odd lot of “fools and rascals,” who neither read nor talked about the case, was sworn
in as the jury. Twain commented, “The system rigidly excludes honest men and men of
brains.”177 When a case is highly publicized, jury selection works to lower the
educational level of jurors. For example, people who read a daily newspaper or watch or
listen to the news will be eliminated because they follow the events too closely. In order
to ensure that a jury is composed of informed citizens, I would define the impartial
standard more flexibly. As opposed to focusing on knowledge about a particular case, I
would focus instead on juror open-mindedness and willingness to consider only the
evidence presented at the trial. In this way, the jury won’t exclude “men of brains.”
Impartiality is mentioned in the legislation but it remains to be seen how it will be
interpreted.178

CONCLUSION
Even though I have substantial concerns regarding the configuration of the juries
in Japan, I have no doubt that group solutions are usually better than individual solutions
and larger group solutions are ordinarily better than smaller group solutions.179 Groups
will tend to remember more than an individual, and individual prejudice can be
neutralized in a group setting. The Supreme Court of the United States considered the
issue of a five-person jury in Ballew v Georgia.180 After reviewing the research data181

177

Mark Twain, ROUGHING IT 256 (Signet Classic, New American Library, 1872).
Criminal Trial, supra note 29, at art. 34 and art. 18 which is a provision on impartiality.
179
Lempert, supra note 90 at 50; cited in Hastie, Penrod, Pennington, supra note 112.
180
435 U.S. 223 (1979).
181
Ballew turned to the following research: E.g., Michael J. Saks, JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF GROUP
SIZE AND SOCIAL DECISION RULE, (Lexington Books, 1977); Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Mech, The
Decision Processes of 6- and 12-Person Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and Two-Third Majority Rules,
32 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1 (1975); Richard Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible"
Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643 (1975); Stuart S. Nagel &
178

36

the court concluded that numerosity insured more effective group deliberation.182 Saks
also found the greater the size of the jury the more likely it would be accurate.183 The
studies cited do not reflect the status differences among the jurors as would exist in the
mixed-jury system in Japan.184
The hope is that this is a first step in the implementation of the Japanese jury.
Subsequent steps with the JSRC primary intent of creating a “popular base” in mind
might move from mixed juries to the American model of exclusively citizen juries. Also
it is hoped that as juries become more inculcated into japanese society expansion of jury
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decision making will take place. The JSRC indicated that flexible as they discussed the
creation of an appropriate environment for the introduction of a new jury system as well
as a constant monitoring and modification of the system to insure a “popular base.”185
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